FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT

As our world continues to spin out of control, two horrible events last week had special resonance for me: the spreading anthrax terror, and the death of my old Afghan comrade-in-arms, Abdul Haq.

First, anthrax. In late 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, I was in Baghdad, Iraq, covering the impending Gulf War. In a futile effort to prevent threatened US air attacks, Saddam Hussein rounded up foreigners and held them hostage in Baghdad hotels. This brutish act - which provoked outrage around the world - was a typical example of the Muslim world's uncanny knack for negative, self-defeating, public relations.

Among the hostages, I discovered three British scientists who had been employed at Iraq's top secret Salman Pak chemical and biowarfare plant. Two of the Britons confided to me they had been working to develop a weaponized form of anthrax for Iraq's army.

At the time, the public did not yet knew that Iraq was trying to use anthrax as a weapon. My dispatches from Baghdad were the first indication that Iraq had progressed beyond crude, World War I - style chemical weapons. The Iraqis threatened to hang me as a spy.

What made this news so fascinating was: 1. the British scientists told me they were part of a large technical team secretly organized and `seconded' to Iraq in the mid-1980's by the British government and Secret Intelligence Service, MI6. And 2: the feed stocks for all of the germ weapons being developed by Iraq came from an American laboratory in Maryland. Iraq received full approval from the US government to buy anthrax, plague, botulism, and other pathogens. Here is a prime case of what spooks call `blowback.'

Why did Britain and the US covertly help Iraq to develop biological weapons? When an Islamic revolution overthrew the US-backed shah of Iran in 1979, the US and Britain determined to overthrow the new regime in Tehran, which was seen as a threat to their Mideast oil interests. Washington and London urged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in 1980 and march on Tehran. US and British money, arms, and military assistance flowed secretly to Baghdad.

But by 1983, Iraq was on the defensive and near to losing the war. Iran, with nearly four times Iraq's population, was fighting back ferociously, swamping Iraqi defenses with human wave attacks. In desperation, Iraq, US and Britain began a crash development program to produce chemical and biological weapons to break Iran's attacks and offset its numerical superiority. Iraq's chemical arsenal savaged Iran's infantry and helped Iraq win the war by 1988. Over 500,000 soldiers died in the conflict.

In the Anglo-American view, chemical and biological weapons were fine - so long as they were used to kill or maim Iranian Muslims who opposed western interests. Such monstrous weapons, it seems, are only associated with terrorism when used against westerners. My view: what goes around, comes around, as the old song goes.

Second, Abdul Haq. A leading mujihadin leader during the great jihad, or holy struggle, of the 1980's against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Haq was a burly, colorful, intense man, one of the most charismatic Pashtun leaders and a CIA favorite. I was with Abdul Haq and his men both in Peshawar and inside Afghanistan. Haq, and his brother, Hadji Kadir, gave me the hospitality of their home and their badly needed protection during the important battle for Jalalabad.

When the Afghan communist regime offered $50,000 to Afridi tribesmen around the Khyber Pass to capture me, two jeeploads of Haq's warriors ensured I was not kidnapped and sent to be tortured and executed in Kabul.

After 11 September, CIA resumed contacts with its old ally Abdul Haq that were broken off in 1989. When it became clear in recent weeks that the Russian-created Northern Alliance, a motly collection of Tajiks and Uzbeks, would be unable to take over Afghanistan from the Pushtun Taliban, CIA sought an anti-Taliban Pushtun leader, and naturally called the renowned Abdul Haq.

Last week, CIA sent Haq and a handful of supporters into Afghanistan with bags of dollars to bribe Pushtun tribal leaders away from Taliban. Haq, who was headstrong and impulsive, foolishly went along with CIA's hasty, poorly concocted scheme.

Like CIA's unbroken record of bloody fiascos in Iraq, this amateurish venture also failed disastrously. Forewarned by sympathizers in Peshawar, Taliban surrounded Haq's party. Haq, who had lost a foot to a Soviet mine, tried to flee on horseback. CIA bungled an attempt to rescue him, though two of its agents with Haq managed to escape on US helicopters. My old friend was captured and summarily executed by Taliban as a warning to any potential defectors.

The life of one of the heroes of the great jihad against Soviet oppression was thus thrown away in a botched, amateur mission in an unnecessary war. Another CIA `expendable asset' had been expended.

Ten days before his fatal mission, Abdul Haq urged the US not to bomb Afghanistan, warning doing so would only rally Afghans to Taliban, inflict massive new suffering on an already tortured nation, and plunge Afghanistan into disintegration and chaos.

No one in war-fevered Washington listened to Abdul Haq.